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THE PLACE OF VOLITION IN EDUCATION.*

SIR WILLIAM J. COLLINS.

I AM afraid that it was with a rash precipitancy and an undue self-complacency that I accepted the flattering invitation of your indefatigable Secretary to deliver this year the annual address to your League. I ought to have reflected that unlike your orators of preceding years I could bring but scanty equipment to so formidable a task. I can neither lay claim to their philosophic erudition nor to their didactic experience. I trust that I have shown when occasion presented, a sincere if somewhat intermittent sympathy with the objects of your League, a sympathy which I hope has sometimes led to practical results. As a teacher my direct experience has been limited to medical students, who are generally, though I think unfairly, regarded as unpropitious material for the art of the moral reformer or as imperfectly profiting by the efforts lavished upon their moral amelioration. True, as the first Chairman of the Education Committee of the London County Council, it was my privilege to become acquainted, administratively, with the labors of some twenty-five thousand teachers upon whom devolved the physical, mental, and moral education of some eight

* Annual Address to the Moral Education League in London, February, 1913.

hundred thousand London children in provided and non-provided schools. It fell to my lot to listen to some of the religious instruction given in Council schools. I witnessed then and subsequently in the House of Commons the excitement which discussion upon religious education was calculated to arouse in representative bodies, and I became aware of the unholy passions let loose by any proposal to modify the syllabus of religious instruction promulgated for the use of the schools. So much so that a religious syllabus, inherited by the London County Council from the School Board, but which had been periodically subjected to revision, has become more or less stereotyped. It was even inserted in a Government Bill as a schedule and was in a fair way to be canonized for all time as the State conception of what religious education should include and exclude.

I recall the fact that in May, 1906, at the instance of your League, along with the late Mr. Pickersgill and Mr. Gooch, I waited upon Mr. Birrell, then Education Minister, in one of the little rooms in the House of Commons off Star Chamber Court, and I remember how we then and there convinced that genial soul of the desirability of including within the Code some provision for instruction of a moral and civic character. Such provision has accordingly been made in the Code since the year 1906.

Again I recall a debate in the House of Commons on March 16, 1909, when I seconded the motion made by Mr. Gooch in these words: "That in the opinion of this House provision should be made in the Code for moral instruction to be efficiently given in every elementary school, and that the regulations for the training of Teachers should be so amended as to secure that they are adequately trained to give such instruction." The Debate followed on the heels of the Great Naval Scare discussion, and possibly the temper and judgment of the House had been unsettled by the unfortunate exhibition then made. Any way, several of the speeches delivered that night were full of misconceptions as to the inten-

tions and purposes of those who urged that greater attention should be given than heretofore to systematic moral training in our schools.

The motion was met by an amendment the mover and seconder of which professed to see no meaning in our motion unless it were one of covert hostility to religious instruction. Another speaker regarded our proposals as representing amiable but impossible ideals; a fourth understood the proposal to be, as he infelicitously put it, that one hour should be devoted to moral and all the rest to immoral instruction. A fifth professed to regard the motion, if not inspired by a Machiavellian desire to uproot all religion, as an elaborate method for making teachers into machines for the manufacture of prigs. Even **Mr. Runciman**, then Minister for Education, failed to grasp our object, for while he "offered no opposition to the motion on the paper," he deemed it not superfluous to warn us that "morality was not to be taught by any scientific classification of the moral virtues." When in the following May at your League's request, I introduced a deputation to **Mr. Runciman**, I again felt, owing no doubt to my own default, that the President of the Board remained either unimpressed or unconvinced by the representations which had been made to him.

I cannot help feeling that some of the passive *inertia* as well as the active suspicion and hostility with which your movement has been confronted is due, at any rate in part, to a misapprehension, or an erroneous prepossession, as to what is meant by moral education and training, and as to the methods by which it is held that such culture may be fostered.

It may be owing to ambiguity of the terms employed that some critics appear to view moral educationists as fussy faddists, self-righteous intermeddlers, or prudish puritans. That such an obsession exists in the minds of many worthy and conventional people I have no doubt whatever. Morality is not colloquially regarded as the science of conduct. "Definitions," said **John Hunter**,

"are of all things the most damnable," and I do not propose to attempt any. It might be said of morality, as it has been said of Time, "I know what it is when you do not ask me." It is because I think we might disarm some of our critics by what may appear a less ambitious, but I believe not less effective approach to what we have in view, that I have ventured to group my discursive remarks under the title, "The Place of Volition in Education." Before proceeding further, however, I would like to refer to and estimate at its proper value that other great source of misapprehension and misrepresentation, *viz.*, the relation of moral education to religious education. I said in the House of Commons, and now repeat, that:

I should be the last to deny that religion gives force and color and sanction and sanctity to all moral instruction, but there is a large gap which is not filled up at the present time. With hygiene on the one hand and religion on the other there is a large intermediate realm occupied by such instruction as cleanliness of body and mind, orderliness, punctuality in performance of duties, good manners, fortitude, kindness, self-respect and self-sacrifice. These form an ascending series. If on the one hand you assert that moral instruction has its base in the physical and physiological, you must also admit that on the other hand it has its crown in religion.

To separate morality from religion then in the minds of religious persons would be as impossible as to separate the shadow from the substance. But what is the position which religious education occupies in the schools of the State? Is it given in all public schools with such efficiency, such unrestricted thoroughness and in accord with the faith alike of the parents and the pedagogue, as to supersede and render superfluous any systematic endeavor to raise the moral ideals, to encourage the exercise of the will and to cultivate those civic virtues to which all render homage and to which no denomination is repugnant? Let us look at the facts.

In the first place, the giving or withholding of any religious instruction at all in publicly provided elementary schools is entirely at the option of the local education authority. If religious instruction of any kind be

given, the Conscience Clause empowers a parent to withdraw his child from it, while such religious instruction as is vouchsafed comes under the restriction of the Cowper-Temple clause. That clause enacts that no religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught in the school. From this it would appear to follow either that no religious formulary may be taught, or that only such formularies as are deemed by the Board of Education or the Courts to be held jointly by two or more denominations may be taught in State-provided schools. The Board in the past have held that the Church catechism in its entirety is forbidden, but that the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer may be taught under the limits of the Statute. When I inquired of the President (June 2, 1908) whether the Board regarded the Nicene Creed and the Athanasian Creed as falling within the undenominational religion authorized by the Act as well as the Apostles' Creed, I was referred to an illuminating answer which stated that the Board now possess no power to determine authoritatively the legality or otherwise of the teaching of any specified formulary in Council schools. Such power, since the Education Act of 1902 became law, is held to reside wholly with the Courts of Law.

Following the example set many years ago by the London School Board, the practice of many local education authorities has been to require that the Bible be read and such explanations and instruction therefrom in the principles of the Christian religion and of morality be given as are suited to the capacities of children, provided that no attempt be made to attach children to any particular denomination.

As regards the efficiency of such religious instruction as is thus given, at the option of the local authorities under such restrictions and provisos, it is to be remembered that by Section 7 (3) of the 1870 act, it is enacted "that it shall be no part of the duties of His Majesty's

Inspectors to inquire into any instruction in religious subjects given at such schools or to examine any scholar therein in religious knowledge or in any religious subject or book."

Such, then, are the arrangements for imparting religious instruction to the majority of children, at least some three and one-half millions, in the public elementary schools of this country. It was a well-meant but ill-contrived attempt to include religion and exclude dogma,—a problem which, Mr. Gladstone averred, had not been solved by any State or Parliament. It is doubtless due to the confidence justifiably though blindly reposed in the teachers that such a system has worked as well as, and with as little friction as, it has done. The attempts made in 1906 and 1908 to amend the Education Acts failed, and there does not appear to be any urgent disposition to renew the attempt to remove the grievances which offend the consciences of many, even in the notorious case of the so-called single school areas. It is claimed that Cowper-Templeism represents the "Common Protestantism" of England, and that it consists with the faith of many Churchmen and Nonconformists alike. But modern Nonconformity differs from that of 1870, and no longer accepts the views then held by the late Mr. Richards, when he said, "If I know anything of the principles of Nonconformity, one of the most fundamental and universally acknowledged by them is this,—that it is not right to take money received from the general taxation of the country and apply it to purposes of religious instruction and worship."

In the "voluntary" schools on the other hand, where some two million children receive their education, religious instruction may be given which is coterminous with the whole faith of the teacher and in full accord with the doctrines of the denomination which founded the particular school. The grievance here is that for their maintenance money is taken compulsorily from those who do not share that religious belief, but may

regard it as erroneous and even as harmful. The emphasis laid upon distinctive doctrine in such school, which is indeed its *raison d'être*, must tend to set less store upon those moral qualities upon which all unite, than upon the dogmatic teaching which divides, the denominations. When, as Chairman of the London Education Committee, I dropped in casually to Council schools in various parts of London, I found that Cowper-Templeism in practice might often cover little more than information regarding the history and geography of Palestine, while occasionally it might embrace the singing of a hymn highly charged with doctrinal implications. From what I am told by some who are responsible for religious instruction in non-provided schools, I gather that dogmatic and strictly denominational instruction in them is carried to its fullest development. The net result of the present dichotomy of the schools, due to the religious difficulty, is that the teaching of so-called morality in provided schools is apt to be imperilled by fear of encroaching upon the undefined but prohibited formularies, while in non-provided schools such primal importance is attached to their distinctive formularies as often to operate to the detriment of systematic cultivation of those moral principles which unite rather than divide the contending sects.

It is worth while to consider for a moment why it is that certain moral teaching, like the ordinary code subjects, can be given in the schools with general approval, while certain religious teaching cannot. The difference in the two cases is one rather of degree than of kind. I endeavored in the House of Commons during the discussion of the so-called "secular solution," when proposed in 1906, to point out what I conceived to be the true explanation, though the House is perhaps scarcely the place for metaphysical arguments.

Any thoughtful person must surely recognize that in every science, sooner or later, the mind is brought up against what have been called the *à-priorities* of knowl-

edge. In natural science such as biology you cannot go far without being confronted with the problem of 'vitalism,'—of life, its nature and its origin,—which has been so differently expounded and explained by the Church Scientific at different epochs of philosophic thought. In the physical sciences you may perhaps penetrate deeper, but there comes ere long the question of the nature of matter and force. In psychology the great mystery of consciousness confronts us, idealism and materialism compete for our acceptance, while if we speak of epistemology, the science of sciences, the *whence*, the *why*, and the *whither* encompass and obscure the margins of all that positive knowledge which an army of specialists in each of the sciences is ever seeking to increase and to systematize. In all branches of knowledge we readily accept as common ground certain *axiomata media* upon which we build as accepted *data*. This is also true of ethics, although there is the great mystery of the moral sense, of conscience, on which contending schools have waged and will continue to wage a wordy warfare.

In the case of *religion*, on the other hand, which tells of the ratio of the finite to the infinite, these *à priori* questions necessarily meet us *in limine* and are clamant for answer before we pass on our way to further study. No *axiomata media* will here suffice, the common territory is reduced to the smallest dimensions, to a vanishing point, the contending sects are ready with their own and several dogmatic answers to all the *à-priorities* and, while it may be possible for a certain collection of sects to find a common denominator which may suffice for the group, there is always the possibility of some uncompromising creed requiring that its doctrine should permeate the whole teaching secular and religious alike, and demand an atmosphere which shall be all its own. I recall the case of a learned divine who maintained that even a subject like bacteriology bore a different complexion when taught by one who professed the faith which he shared from that it might assume when expounded in the

laboratory, say, of an agnostic. Such views as these which culminate in the demand for an *atmosphere* all their own are, I submit, but a recognition in an extreme and unlimited degree of the fact of the relativity of all knowledge and of the dependence of the whole upon, and the permeation of the whole by, *à priori* and fundamental considerations which receive differential treatment by different varieties of religious experience. If logical and complete recognition and liberty are to be accorded to each and every type of religious atmosphere, then, in a country with many different religions, compromise fails and a national system of education crumbles to pieces.

Without pursuing this theme further, I think enough has been said to show that, so far from "moral instruction and training" being antithetic to religious education or to religion itself, it would be truer to say that moral instruction has itself suffered from the scientific agnosticism which for the latter half of the last century held such sway over the minds of the learned, and which so profoundly influenced professional teaching.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the domination alike of our pedagogy and our penology,—for both are or ought to be educational,—by the philosophy of Bentham, of the Mills, father and son, and of that form of it with which many of us were indoctrinated from the pages of Alexander Bain.

In an address I gave in 1905, I endeavored to trace some of the results which have flowed from the acceptance of, or reluctant and overawed acquiescence in, the tenets of that self-complacent and self-assertive school. While in psychology it stood for the experience philosophy, in morals it was necessitarian and hedonist. Such teaching paved the way for the cruder developments of materialism and determinism. "Man is what he eats." "The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." "Without phosphorus there is no thought,"—were the engaging watchwords of this pontifical school of sci-

tists. In the apotheosis of Science as the only knowledge worth having, the humanities were thrust into the back-ground. As the author of "Vivian Grey" happily put it at the time: "In the present day we are all studying science and none of us are studying ourselves. This is not exactly the Socratic process; and as for the *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* of the more ancient Athenian, that principle is quite out of fashion in the nineteenth century." That generation needed the reminder of Matthew Arnold of the consequences which must ever await those who would thus divide up the circle of knowledge. We find in his writings an explanation of the intellectual impotence and moral ineffectiveness which mark the exclusive pursuit of some one science, or rather of science itself exclusively. He said: "Neither humanists nor realists adequately conceive the circle of knowledge, and each party is unjust to all that to which its own aptitudes do not carry it. The humanists are loath to believe that man has any access to vital knowledge except by knowing himself,—the poetry, philosophy, history which his spirit has created; the realist that he has any access except by knowledge of the world,—the physical sciences, the phenomena, and the laws of nature." But be it remembered, "the study of letters is the study of the operation of human force, of human freedom and activity; the study of nature is the study of the operation of non-human forces, of human limitation and passivity. The contemplation of human force and activity tends naturally to heighten our own force and activity, the contemplation of human limits and passivity tends rather to check it. Therefore the men who have had the humanistic training have played, and yet play, so prominent a part in human affairs, in spite of their prodigious ignorance of the universe, because their training has powerfully fomented the human force within them." What we have since learned of the transmutation of forces, the mutability of species, the evolution of the once 'unchanging' elements has given us a dynamic in place of a static

conception of the universe as the theater of action of force, of will,—of the realization of idea.

Science, by disclosing the methods whereby the phenomena with which it deals have developed, and in synthesizing into generalizations the *modus operandi* of their interactions has, as Martineau says, shown us how “these physical pursuits followed into their haunts run up into a series of notions common to them all,—expressed by such words as *law*, *cause*, *force*,—which at once transfer the jurisdiction from the provincial Courts of the special senses to the High Chancery of Universal Philosophy.” The old school of materialism and determinism, which less than a generation ago appeared so unassailable, has in fact been snowed under by the accumulating discoveries which Science herself has brought to light. The last effort made by its disciples was to vouchsafe a doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism as a sufficient explanation of the mystery of mind and matter. Content to allow that between matter, with its characteristic of extension, and personality, with its characteristic of consciousness and volition, no thinkable point of convergence or contact could be detected, they are prepared to take refuge in this *ignoratio elenchi*. Wundt, who is generally invoked as authoritative on such doctrine, sets out indeed by brushing aside metaphysics, but when we arrive at his final conclusion of the whole matter we find him asserting that “mental phenomena cannot be referred to bodily as effect to cause. . . . Personal character is the ultimate cause of volition,” and that on such questions our ‘appeal’ must be not to physiology, but “to metaphysics for an answer.” When I presided at M. Bergson’s lecture in London last year, I was not surprised to find that the author of “Creative Evolution” denounced the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism as totally inadmissible.

Now John Stuart Mill, with the utmost candor, admitted that the doctrine of *à priori* principles is one and the same, whether applied in the mental or the moral sphere,

whether applied to the knowledge of *truth* or that of *duty*. If you are *à priori* in physics, you will be so in ethics. The metaphysical method, accepted in the one, will not be rejected for the other. The same general tendency of thought applies to 'what I am' as 'to what I ought to be,' —to the explication alike of *consciousness* and of *conscience*. The experience philosopher will be a necessitarian in morals and a utilitarian in ethics, while the *à priori* school will stand for free-will—a moral sense—and vouchsafe a rule for conduct—apart from the pursuit of pleasure.

If with the author of "Literature and Dogma" we regard conduct and character as making up three quarters of life, if we agree that if a man is to be a knave, he had better be a fool also, how relatively high a value must we accordingly concede to volition in any complete educational system.

Beccaria, from whom Bentham derived his greatest happiness formula, held that "the philosophy of the heart is above that of the intellect," and the store which he set upon the emotions alike in forming and reforming character has met a response in the minds of all thoughtful philanthropists; yet Beccaria himself had occasion to lament that the enlightenment of a nation is at least a century in advance of its practice.

Unless we recognize in each personality a voluntary coöperation in the architecture of his or her own character, that is to say, a will free to choose the higher in the presence of a lower, and fortified by faithfulness to the better choice, a self-conscious power actuated by ideals which transcend the merely prudential motives of appetite and sense, a will which translates I *must* into I *ought* in the pursuit of disinterested good, our efforts alike in educating the child, in rehabilitating the erring and in reforming the criminal must ever be foredoomed to failure.

The blighting influence of the determinist and utilitarian doctrine has led us to adopt the proffered acquisi-

tion of some material good or the apprehension of some material deprivation as the regimen of the school and the routine system of a reformatory or prison.

Hedonism and necessitarianism, I have often urged, will prove false guides and uninspiring mentors in fostering the growth of character in the young or in bringing about any social amelioration, though they pursue the paths of despotic philanthropy, invoke torture as part of judicial punishment or adopt other Draconian methods so much in vogue in certain esoteric circles. Such methods which may generally be found at the bottom of our penitentiary philosophy are, or ought to be, as much out of date as Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon at Millbank. There are those who are apt to regard delinquency as a disease and following the pretty conceit developed by Samuel Butler's genius in *Erewhon* would reciprocally regard disease as a crime. There are indeed 'borderland' cases in which the mad and the bad run insensibly the one into the other. I think it was Paget who, when referring to a hystero-epileptic who could not move her limb, said with felicitous epigram, "She says, 'I cannot,' it looks like 'I will not,' it is 'I cannot will.'" Yes, indeed, it is true of many imbeciles, degenerates, drug addicts, and 'feeble minded,' whom the legislature finds such difficulty in defining and dealing with, that they are suffering,—if one may use such a collocation of term,—from a disease of the will. They are often profuse in promise, but inept in performance; "I will if I can" is ever on their lips, but the "can if I will" involves a tension to which they are indisposed or unequal. Like the younger of the two sons who said, "I go, Sir," and went not," there is often no go in them.

It has been well said that no one is truly educated unless he is able to do what he ought to do, when he ought to do it, whether he wants to do it or not, or as a yet older authority puts it, he who is master of himself is master of a king, but he who is a slave to himself is the slave of a slave.

The mental philosophy so long current has insisted that volition is one of a trinity of functions or properties of mind,—the other two parties in this triune arrangement being the intellect and the feelings (the latter comprising sensation and emotion). Yet how valueless is such an attempt to dissect up personality. In the sphere of the intellect the influence of volition operates in fixation of the attention, which facilitates memory when otherwise the routine of repetition would have to be invoked to increase the conservation of a perception. Again in the recognition of resemblances and of differences, which together with retentiveness are regarded by Bain and his school as the prerogatives of the intellect, how great a part does volition play in concentrating thought on such phenomena.

In the realm of the emotions again how potent is the action of volition,—the policing of the passions,—the formation of habit, the discipline derived from the voluntary acceptance of inconvenience, of discomfort, of the disagreeable in pursuit of ulterior good.

The ancient philosophers in assigning the mastery to the intellect appeared to minimize the influence of the will. Ecclesiastics like the later exponents of 'necessity' found no place for it in their doctrine of predestination. Kant, however, in the region of the unconditioned gave free play to volition and thought

binding Nature fast in fate
Left free the human will;

while contemporary psychology has come to regard freedom of choice as the prerogative of a man's whole personality, "a man's total reaction upon life."

As we incline to a more idealist interpretation of the universe, and speak of the relation of self-consciousness to the universal consciousness and view the world as will and idea, we render to volition as the dynamic of personality the place and power to which it is entitled and from which it was so long dethroned.

We may, in the words of Kant, hold that the "*will* is a kind of causality in living beings, so far as they are rational, and freedom is the property of this causality in virtue of which it acts independently of extrinsic determining causes, while the causality of all non-rational beings has the property of Nature-necessity whereby they are determined to activity by the operation of extrinsic causes." Translating this thought into the language of education, we may agree with Thring that "the most essential part of training is a certain freedom of choice, by which self-management, self-control, and power to resist is fostered." It is curious that while in so many relations of life that blessed word compulsion is increasingly invoked,—to a degree which even tends to bring law into disrespect by reason of its fussy and sumptuary invasion of territory from which it has been the endeavor of reformers to warn it off,—in the elementary school the recent advocacy of the Montessori method has formulated a plea for the liberty, if not indeed for the autocracy, of child individuality. Our forefathers used to say, "Go and see what the children are doing and tell them they mustn't," whereas the latest cult would subordinate the teacher to the child in obedience to the doctrine, "Enquire what the child demands and let him have it." As a legitimate protest against the "pump and bucket" mode of education, this is doubtless to the good, and the old notion that all education is but contact with a superior mind must yield to a sane employment of the heuristic method. But surely procedure according to principles, which the mature mind and experience of mankind have elaborated, can be of infinite service in training the agent of choice, in cultivating fixity of purpose, in raising high ideals and, by a graded scheme of moral education, help to evolve, not merely a good animal, but a good man. In training the young mind toward self-discipline, not by compelling obedience, but by winning it, lies the secret of true education.

In the report of the Committee which in 1895 inquired into our Prison System, there is a quotation from a conversation that the late Michael Davitt had with an intelligent habitual criminal in Dartmoor in which the latter said: "Unlike you I had no moral training,—I am a product of your civilization, you allowed me to grow up with my animal instincts uncorrected, and then you send me to prison for exercising them." So recently as 1909 the Home Secretary told the House of Commons: "The prison authorities now have no responsibility for the prisoners' moral condition or future welfare put upon them by the law, and they are not bound to turn them out better men than when they went in," and it was accordingly not surprising that he added that "statistics show that with every conviction the probability of return to prison is increased." This reads very like the words used by Samuel Romilly one hundred years earlier when he began his beneficent campaign, *viz.*: "that those confined in common gaols return to society much worse than when they were first withdrawn from it," due in his opinion to the neglect of the wise and benevolent principles which the late John Howard had then been industriously promulgating.

I know there is a modern school of fatalistic criminology who affect to regard a proportion of the population as degenerate from birth, as anti-social, vicious by nature and instinct, and predestined to a life of crime. These they would permanently segregate for the benefit of the rest, if indeed more drastic treatment be not prescribed. While fully admitting that there are those who bear the physical stigmata of degeneracy and imbecility, it is no easy task to establish a competent tribunal to adjudicate upon the more obscure cases at the other end of the scale. The wonderful results which have followed patient working on the moral plane, the transforming influence of a great affection, the personal magnetism exerted by a friendly guide, the marvels of 'the subliminal self,' the mystical phenomena associated with 'conversion,' and the

yet more occult phenomena of hypnotic suggestion, give pause to too autocratic measures in regarding as hopelessly irreclaimable those classes of our fellow creatures whom we condemn in advance as criminal by nature.

If the same care were devoted to training the will,—that master faculty of the mind,—as is devoted to physical exercises or intellectual memorizing, I cannot help feeling that school life could be made more prophylactic than it is against criminal propensity or the easy lapsing into mere selfish indulgence. It is not pleasant to read in the last Report of the Chief Medical Officer to the Board of Education that recent inspection has “revealed a state of things much worse than was generally known to exist” of the “discreditable conditions” that prevail in some schools,—that “uncleanliness of person in school children constitutes a seriously adverse commentary on their training and education. It is impossible (he says) to consider any system of education as adequate which does not insure, as an early result, implanting in the child feelings of self-respect.” A few months ago Mrs. Humphry Ward wrote in the “Times” (January 6, 1913): “I believe that many persons giving their best energies to primary education will bear me witness when I say that one of the heaviest anxieties now weighing upon them is concerned with what seems to be, at any rate, the increase of immorality and vice among children,” and speaks of a terrible condition of things among certain strata of London children. Is there no connection between the hooliganism and lack of self-respect and self-restraint, which we deplore, and the quality of the training which children receive in the impressionable years from five to fourteen in our public elementary schools? Is all done that might be done even under limitations which in the name of religion we impose, to cultivate that *power over self*, which knowledge, though power it be, is not? Is it sufficient to leave such moral instruction and training, as it were, to chance, to a casual permeation of the curriculum? What can be

done at any time is apt to be done not at all, and what is everybody's duty is nobody's duty.

To give point and purpose to the training of volition and to directing conative powers toward high ideals, the object and method alike must be clearly conceived and systematically carried out. Such end will be achieved not indeed by "disquisitions on the scientific classification of the moral virtues," but by imbuing our teachers with those qualities of head and heart which are essential to their high vocation and by conceding to self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control that place in the training of youth which has too long been usurped by too exclusive attention paid to merely physical and intellectual attainments. In bringing about this most necessary reform this Moral Instruction League will, I doubt not, continue to play a great and important part until indeed the time shall come when its efforts will be exhausted in fulfillment, and the place of volition in education shall be recognized as being that which in truth it is,—second to none.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

W. J. COLLINS.

LORD HUGH CECIL'S "CONSERVATISM."

C. D. BROAD.

THE recent work on Conservatism by Lord Hugh Cecil has attracted less attention than it deserves. For really its publication may claim to be something of a literary and political event. Although the number of convinced Conservatives is, and has always been, as great as that of convinced Liberals, and although J. S. Mill's gibe about the "stupid party" has only a very small modicum of truth, it remains a fact that advanced politicians have always been much readier with the intellectual analysis and philosophic theory of their views than their opponents. We need only instance Bentham